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Abstract —At SURA’s October 2014 workshop, entitled “Understanding and Modeling 
Risk and Resilience in Complex Coastal Systems,” it was decided that a future workshop 
to assess the benefits of collaboration among social and physical scientists should be 
guided by a conceptual scenario applied to a specific coastal community. The following 
scenario weaves complex engineering, environmental, and community resilience 
elements into a story, which is coherent, systematic, comprehensive, and plausible. This 
scenario has been developed to create integrated word pictures of how the future might 
evolve in coastal Broward County, Florida. These images provide context for planning, a 
proving ground for ideas, or the stimulus for new research and development. The 
scenario-driven exercises may serve as a tool for improved decision making against a 
background of possible future environments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. The purpose of this series of workshops is to identify ways that the understanding, 
predictive modeling and management of risk and resilience of coastal communities can 
be improved and facilitated by an interdisciplinary, multi-institutional collaborative 
approach. The collaborative framework envisioned should incorporate physical, social, 
organizational, economic, environmental, and engineering variables supported by 
observations and is intended to engage scientists and decision makers from universities, 
federal, state and local agencies, industry, NGOs and social justice advocacy groups. The 
intent of the following fictional/hypothetical scenario is to ground discussions and 
stimulate identification of the information, cyber infrastructure and model developments 
needed to respond to both long and short-term coastal emergencies. The scenario 
contains some pessimistic and some overly optimistic parts. We should seek strategies to 
prevent or reduce the negative possibilities while making the more optimistic possibilities 
future realities.   
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2. Background: Long Range Planning, Budget Constraints, and Infrastructure 
 
2.1 In the years leading 
up to 2035, Broward 
County’s infrastructure 
was maintained and 
enhanced to the extent that 
budget constraints 
allowed. As was the case 
throughout Florida, the 
county government relied 
on intermittent funding 
from Federal and State 
sources and most of the 
private sector offered little 
assistance. An exception 
was the hotel and 
insurance industries, 
which acknowledged the 
serious threats from rising seas and increased storminess.  Congress provided just enough 
funds for absolutely critical repairs, and left other infrastructure work to non-federal 
sources and the tax revenue obtained from the Inland Waterways Trust Fund, itself now 
stretched to cover federal infrastructure expenses other than waterways. Despite these 
limitations of resources, Broward County endeavored to maintain a forward looking and 
holistic approach to planning. 
 
2.2 The most populous cities in 2015 remain so in 2035, however cities in Eastern 
Broward can expect more growth than their Western counterparts. Fortunately, 
enlightened county administrators heeded the predictions of increasingly sophisticated 
numerical models.  Those models predicted increased groundwater elevations and 
decreased storm-water storage and discharge capacity as a result of accelerated sea level 
rise and increased erosion and storm surge damage as a result of increased frequency and 
intensity of tropical storms making Southeast Florida the most threatened coastal urban 
center in the world. In anticipation of potential future disasters, Broward County and its 
municipalities had already, by 2015, begun developing adaptation strategies and 
“triaging” allocations of limited resources to protect the most vulnerable -and critical 
public infrastructure. Included in infrastructure development by 2025 were improvements 
in storm water drainage systems including installations of tide back-flow flaps on 
outfalls, new pumps and an increase in land dedicated to surface water storage. In 
accordance with conventional wisdom, prioritizations of resource allocations were guided 
by traditional cost-benefit analyses. Those analyses suggested that, in 2015 assets worth 
nearly $420B were in jeopardy in Miami and $5B in Broward County, assuming 2 feet of 
sea level rise by 2030.  These cost estimates do not include storm damage events, impacts 
from loss of services or other indirect impacts to the economy.  
 
 
The Greater Fort Lauderdale/Broward County Convention 
Center is a waterfront facility that has been built along the 
Intracoastal Waterway (Credit http://ftlauderdalecc.com/). 
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2.3 Prior to 2030, 
waterfront and oceanfront 
real estate property was 
most valuable and was 
precluded from ownership 
by lower and middle class 
income households. As 
these low-lying vulnerable 
areas were more 
frequently flooded by 
storms, eventually on a 
daily basis by tides and 
gradually over time 
completely inundated by 
sea level rise, wealthy 
populations migrated to 
higher ground. Higher 
ground was located along 
the coastal ridge (an 
ancient sand dune running 
north to south) and within the central corridor of the county.  As value of these higher 
elevation properties escalated, low income families were forced to move into higher 
density areas or to low-lying, flood-prone areas in the western part of the county adjacent 
to the Everglades. The population of these areas nearly doubled between 2015 and 2035 
as more low-income retirees, service-related hotel employees and Port Everglades 
workers including many non-English-speaking immigrants, located there.  
 
2.4 Affluent neighborhoods became increasingly inward-focused and isolated from 
their less fortunate neighbors. Low lying communities needed improved drinking water 
facilities, wastewater management plants, and storm sewers. Tragically, lack of funds 
prevented all of the required infrastructure improvements from being extended to 
outlying areas or to poor communities. Poor people suffered from unreliable water 
systems that often promoted disease. Groundwater pumping and septic tanks dramatically 
increased in the outer suburbs as communities refused to extend their infrastructure to 
new housing developments. Water became an issue that often surfaced in local political 
and statewide contests. Road maintenance had been significantly neglected and by 2025 
many low-lying communities became cut off by flooded roads during “King Tides” and 
increasingly recurrent storm surges. This created a growing impediment for effective and 
timely hurricane evacuation.  
 
3. The Rising Threat 
  
3.1 Over the period from 2015 to 2035, the average high tide had increased steadily, 
but between 2030 and 2035 the rate of sea level rise increased at an average rate of 
1.27″/year more or less as predicted by numerical models. In the year 2035, the mean sea 
level in Southeast Florida was already more than a foot higher than it had been only a 
 
Port Everglades, Florida is one of the top three cruise 
ports in the world, is among the most active containerized 
cargo ports in the United States, and is an important 
seaport for petroleum products such as gasoline and jet 
fuel. (Credit http://www.porteverglades.net/). 
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quarter of a century earlier. The rise in sea level was related in p art to the global rise in 
average ocean surface elevation, in part to a slowing of the Gulf Stream and in part to 
increased occurrences of strong onshore winds. When the highly predictable “King 
Tides” of October were superimposed on the higher sea level, flooding of neighborhoods 
prevailed and the effects 
were greatly magnified 
when tropical-storm force 
onshore winds coincided 
with the high water events. 
On an almost annual basis 
after 2025 street flooding of 
low-lying neighborhoods 
paralyzed traffic, sewers 
were flooded, drinking 
water was contaminated and 
water-borne pathogens were 
spread throughout low-
income neighborhoods. 
  
3.2 Also, after a 
comparative lull of a 
decade, tropical storms and 
hurricanes resumed their 
assault on Southeast Florida 
beginning in 2017. Over the period 2020 to 2035, Florida was impacted by 75 named 
storms. Of these, 11 were hurricanes of Category 3 or greater. The toll enacted by these 
storms on Broward County, particularly on the poorer neighborhoods was cumulative and 
devastating. In early July 2028, Category 5 “Hurricane Etienne made landfall just south 
of Homestead Florida. Fortunately, forecasts by the National Hurricane Center (NHC) 
had begun over a week before the storm’s arrival. The forecasts were accurate and were 
heeded and all vulnerable residents had been safely evacuated prior to landfall. But the 
aftermath was catastrophic: over half of the county’s homes were destroyed by storm 
surge flooding and wind damage, the capacity of storm water control systems was 
exceeded, the entrance to Port Everglades was filled with sand and rubble, and the lower 
floors and lobbies of high-end hotels were flooded. Thankfully, because of greatly 
improved computer forecasts, and the wisdom of emergency managers, there was no loss 
of life. But the worst was still to come. 
 
4.  Emergency Management 2035: Preparing for Hurricane Yvonne 
 
4.1 In the years following Hurricane Etienne there were numerous named storms that 
crossed the Atlantic toward Florida or formed over the warm waters of the Caribbean or 
Gulf of Mexico. Fortunately for Southeast Florida, the few storms that made direct 
landfall there between 2028 and 2035 were either tropical storms or Category 1 
Hurricanes. In contrast to the trend that had prevailed prior to 2010, the strongest storms 
tended to turn northward well to the east of Florida and track up the coast ultimately 
 
The historic Stranahan House in Fort Lauderdale is sited 
along the New River which originates in the Everglades 
and flows east (Credit Environmental Protection and 
Growth Management Department, Broward County). 
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striking the coasts of the Mid Atlantic states including New York Bight and, on occasion, 
New England. Others intensified over the hot waters of the Gulf of Mexico impacting 
West Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas.  The seven years of low storm 
activity in Southeast Florida allowed Miami-Dade and Broward Counties to make much-
needed repairs to infrastructure and allowed many homes and businesses to be rebuilt. 
However, many of those repairs were still underway by late summer 2035 when 
Southeast Florida was hit by a rapid succession of two tropical storms and Category 2 
Hurricane Ursula. With no further disruptions, recovery from those events would have 
required several months to a year. 
 
4.2 Throughout most of the Northern Hemisphere, the summer of 2035 lingered well 
beyond the beginning of autumn. Early in the second week of October, hot Saharan winds 
carried an “easterly wave” off the west coast of Africa and out over the warm waters of 
the tropical Atlantic Ocean. Within a day, an incipient low pressure system had 
developed and was moving steadily westward. Shortly after passing over the Cape Verde 
Islands on its westerly track, the system was labeled a “tropical disturbance” by the 
National Hurricane Center. Two days later, the NHC issued maritime warnings for 
“Tropical Storm Yvonne”.  As the system progressed along its westward course, it 
continued to develop: it was classified a Category 1 Hurricane on October 20 and Cat 2 
on October 22.  A Hurricane watch was issued by NHC for the Lesser Antilles on 
October 23 but hours later, in accordance with forecasts, the system took an abrupt turn 
to the north, then back to the northwest. By October 25 it was clear that Hurricane 
Yvonne, now a Category 3 storm with a growing diameter, had a high probability of 
making landfall somewhere along the coast of Southeast Florida.  The NHC issued the 
appropriate warnings immediately. In the thirty years since Hurricane Katrina devastated 
the city of New Orleans, the uncertainties inherent in numerical predictions had been 
reduced substantially, and forecasts were now widely trusted by public officials as well as 
the general public. There was little dithering as all in the storm’s path prepared for the 
worst.   
 
4.3 At 10 AM on the morning of October 26, 2035, NHC upgraded Hurricane 
Yvonne, which was now centered about 400 miles north of the Dominican Republic, to 
Category 4.  Further intensification was expected prior to landfall and the size of the 
storm had also increased: hurricane force winds now extended outward 120 miles from 
the center. The precise point of landfall had become irrelevant. Evacuations were 
underway in Monroe, Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Southbound 
lanes on Interstate 95 and Florida’s Turnpike were closed to southbound traffic and 
opened as northbound evacuation corridors.  Emergency responders, the National Guard, 
Coast Guard and Florida State Police were placed on alert. By early afternoon on the 26
th
, 
most affluent residents had already departed for higher ground in their private cars but 
many low-income people remained behind, waiting to be picked up by emergency buses 
or friends. For many, neither would come.  
 
4.4 As Yvonne continued its advance toward the Bahamas and Florida, multi-
institutional teams of numerical modelers from NOAA, the Navy, Department of 
Homeland Security, the Netherlands and U.S., Australian and European Universities 
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worked together feverishly in a virtual cyber domain trying to predict the course and 
consequences of the storm. These efforts were appropriately under the auspices of 
NOAA’s National Hurricane Center, which had the final authority for issuing forecasts. 
The ensemble of results from a suite of models converged with little scatter or uncertainty 
on a path that carried Yvonne to the north of Andros Island, across the Gulf Stream, 
where some intensification was predicted, with landfall expected somewhere between 
Homestead and Palm Beach on the evening of October 27 or early morning of October 
28. The wind-field output from the atmospheric models was immediately used as input to 
ocean process models that predicted current, wave and storm surge characteristics 
generated by the storm. Following the wave model predictions, swell forerunners of the 
wind-generated waves were already arriving on Ft. Lauderdale Beach by late afternoon 
on the 26
th
 with heights of 8 to 10 feet. Breaker heights were forecast to reach 30 ft over 
the next 24-36 hours and cause massive beach erosion along with overtopping of 
breakwaters and roads.  Most ominous of all, however, the recently refined storm-surge 
model, ADCIRC IV, was predicting storm surge heights of 30 feet or more above normal 
tidal elevations to prevail shortly prior to landfall of Yvonne, which was upgraded to 
Category 5 by noon on October 27. And routine astronomical tide tables predicted a high 
“King Tide” to occur at 11:15 PM on October 27.  Catastrophic inundation, overprinted 
by severe wave and wind damage now appeared imminent for Miami-Dade and Broward 
Counties.  
 
4.5 Thirty years before 
Yvonne, as Hurricane Katrina 
bore down on New Orleans in 
2005, numerical models, verified 
by wave moorings in the Gulf of 
Mexico, were predicting high 
storm surges for Coastal 
Louisiana. Those predictions 
were readily accessible in real 
time on the World Wide Web in 
the form of color-coded 
animations and numerical data, 
but they were largely ignored by 
local, State and Federal leaders 
as well as by most emergency 
managers. In 2035, the story was 
entirely different. Models had proven their reliability over and over in real-world storm 
events and had undergone rigorous testing, inter comparisons and refinements by way of 
a long series of testbed programs. Few, if any, responsible leaders in 2035 would have 
ignored the forecasts rendered by those models. So when Florida’s Governor was briefed 
on the forecasts on the evening of October 26, more than 24 hours before the storm was 
expected to reach Florida, she contacted the President of the United States and asked that 
a state of emergency be declared for South Florida. The President was initially reluctant 
but eventually agreed. Soon after sunup on the 27
th
, FEMA convoys carrying emergency 
supplies, food, water and temporary housing were headed for high-ground staging areas 
 
Hurricane Katrina nearing the Gulf Coast on August 
28, 2005 (Credit National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration).  
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in central Florida.  Two naval amphibious ships carrying helicopters, long-haul 
communications, and engineering equipment for deployment in rescues were underway 
from Norfolk Naval Base in the hope of being on site as soon as possible after Yvonne 
crossed the southern end of the Florida peninsula into the Gulf of Mexico. Coast Guard 
vessels were also en route. 
 
4.6 Resilience assessments conducted by Broward County were instrumental to 
disaster preparedness for Yvonne.  Findings during resilience assessments contributed to 
the planning of effective humanitarian assistance by interagency partners by helping to 
identify the most vulnerable communities, environments, and facilities. The development 
of realistic scenarios for Broward County benefitted from integrated approaches where 
researchers from the natural and social sciences have worked together with a diversity of 
stakeholders and managers. Programs initiated during 2015 helped to overcome gaps 
between knowledge production on the one hand and the demand for knowledge to 
contribute to the solution of social problems, on the other.  For example, efforts since 
2015 were focused on the integration of physical and social models to understand 
parameters on the same spatial and temporal scales.   Information from ADCIRC IV was 
used with urban models to support search and rescue, selecting parking areas for 
emergency vehicles, supply distribution points, favorable sites for temporary food and 
medical services, sites for sanitation facilities, and debris clearance.  Information from 
ADCIRC IV with ecological models and imagery were useful to assess the degree of 
degradation and likely responses of ecosystems to storms since 2015. 
5. Emergency Management 2035: The Aftermath of Hurricane Yvonne 
 
5.1 Broward County has 
become more vulnerable due to 
usual urban issues and the 
additional pressure of natural 
hazards such as an increased 
occurrence of tropical cyclones.  
Increasing numbers of people are 
now living in low-lying lands that 
were once unoccupied because 
they are flood prone.  Such factors 
stress facilities, ecosystems, and 
communities and weaken 
resilience. The response to the 
aftermath of Hurricane Yvonne 
exposed the weakness of existing emergency management and response policies on all 
levels - local, state, and federal. 
 
5.2 Much progress has been made since 2015, but it is only through review of the 
underlying problems of the current policies and practices that continued progress will 
occur. Resilience approaches in Broward County focuses on five dimensions – physical, 
social, economic, institutional, and natural. Resilience assessments that include 
 
Coastal Resilience (Credit Dr. Julie Rosati, 
USACE, August 26, 2014). 
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multidisciplinary discussions on global and uncertain threats can help advance the ability 
of Broward County to bounce back from disasters. 
  
5.3 The focus on improvements is at the local level since local governments and 
institutions are first respondents and geographically close to the affected community. 
Local universities are sought to play a leadership role to advance resilience in Broward 
County by learning from disasters and teaching and advancing the lessons learned. 
6. Meeting the Challenges Identified in the Foregoing Scenario: Some Questions 
 
6.1 The relatively gloomy demographic and infrastructural developments portrayed in 
Section 2 of the scenario just described are not inevitable. What kinds of data, model 
predictions, management policies and governmental investment strategies might have 
prevented the rather dire circumstances faced by low income residents of Broward 
County in the Year 2035?  Consider the possible needs for predicting “street by street” 
flooding probabilities utilizing detailed topographic data and projected sea level rise as 
well model predictions of future demographics. What are some human health 
considerations such as the feasibility of immunizations against water-borne diseases?  
What kind of protective structures such as sea walls or dikes might have helped had the 
“triaged” allocation of limited resources been more favorable to low income 
communities?  What are some of the ways that the academic community can assist 
governmental agencies at local, state and federal levels in making long-range plans that 
serve all residents? 
 
6.2 The 4th paragraph of Section 4 describes a high level of collaboration within a 
diverse cyber-enabled international team of academic and governmental modelers. That 
facet of this scenario is highly optimistic and promising. Sadly, it would be unlikely in 
2015 or within the next few years for reasons discussed at length in the first workshop in 
October 2014. Most of those reasons are more related to the cultures of universities and 
government agencies than to science and technology. But it is entirely feasible for such 
advanced collaboration to happen within the next decade and this would probably save 
countless lives and alleviate the suffering of millions of people. Some questions to 
consider: How can integration of knowledge, tools and ways of thinking from several 
disciplines and across contrasting administrative entities (e.g., agencies, countries, 
universities) be more effectively facilitated?  What are the primary impediments to such 
collaboration and how can they be overcome?  What advances in cyber tools for rapid 
skill assessment and inter comparison of models are needed before the 2035 modeling 
scenario described can be realized?  What advances (if any) in high performance 
computing capabilities are still needed to enable the virtual cyber domain imagined in 
Section 4, paragraph 4? 
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6.3 Another very 
optimistic- and 
presently unrealistic- 
part of the above 
scenario is the 
complete trust of 
science-based model 
predictions by 
emergency managers 
and leaders at all 
governmental levels. 
In 2015, scientific 
projections are widely 
denied by many 
politicians and 
decision makers. The 
enlightenment envisioned in this scenario must be nurtured by the scientific community 
at large. This will require careful and well-articulated, non-jargonized communication 
over a prolonged period combined with clear demonstrations- over and over and over - 
that the models really work and are not “hocus pocus”. This may be the largest challenge 
of all. So the question is: How do we do that? 
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